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Abstract 
Leuridan (2011) questions whether mechanisms can really replace 
laws at the heart of our thinking about science. In doing so, he enters 
a long-standing discussion about the relationship between the mech-
anistic structures evident in the theories of contemporary biology 
and the laws of nature privileged especially in traditional empiricist 
traditions of the philosophy of science (see e.g. Wimsatt 1974; 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bogen 2005; Darden 2006; Glennan 
1996; MDC 2000; Schaffner 1993; Tabery 2003; Weber 2005). In 
our view, Leuridan misconstrues this discussion. His weak positive 
claim that mechanistic sciences appeal to generalizations is true but 
uninteresting. His stronger claim, that all causal claims require laws, 
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is unsupported by his arguments. Though we proceed by criticizing 
Leuridan’s arguments, our greater purpose is to embellish his argu-
ments in order to show how thinking about mechanisms enriches 
and transforms old philosophical debates about laws in biology and 
provides new insights into how generalizations afford prediction, 
explanation and control.  
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1. Introduction 
Over a decade ago Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000) 
suggested that the philosophy of science, especially the biological 
sciences, could usefully be reconfigured by thinking about how sci-
entists construct, evaluate, and revise their understanding of mecha-
nisms. They boldly asserted that traditional philosophical topics such 
as causation, discovery, explanation, functions, laws, levels, models, 
and reduction would be fundamentally transformed by recognizing 
the centrality to many areas of science of the search for mechanisms. 
The revolution they envisioned replaced the last vestiges of the 
once-received positivist gestalt with a new mechanistic vision, ex-
pressed in the very language in which scientists talk about their work 
and sensitive to problems faced within mechanistic research pro-
grams in areas as diverse as biology, cognitive science, ecology, and 
neuroscience. 
 Though this way of thinking about the philosophy of science 
has gained rapid and widespread acceptance, it has unsurprisingly 
attracted a good deal of criticism from those who wonder whether 
the mechanical philosophy is really as revolutionary as its propo-
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nents suggest and from those who think that traditional ways of 
thinking about the philosophy of science address problems that the 
mechanical philosophy is ill-equipped to handle. And one might be 
forgiven for thinking that there is no more central battle ground in 
that debate than the perennial issue of laws of nature. Positivist phi-
losophy of science and its descendents place the concept of a law of 
nature at the very heart of their thinking about causation, explana-
tion, prediction, and reduction in particular. From that traditional 
vantage point, it is reasonable to ask precisely how the concept of 
mechanism, which plays many of the same roles in the new para-
digm, is related to the concept of a law of nature. 
 So conceived, one naturally sees the concept of mechanism 
as replacement for the concept of laws. And indeed, a casual reading 
of the mechanistic literature would give the impression that this is 
precisely what the mechanists intended to do. Mechanists regularly 
note that the term ‘law’ is descriptively out of place in the biological 
sciences. Biologists and other scientists of the middle range (neuro-
scientists, physiologists, psychologists, etc.) seem to avoid the term 
‘law,’ and conceive of their work instead in terms of the discovery 
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of mechanisms.  Furthermore, the mechanist’s rejection of a law-
centered picture of science is a part of their general rejection of the 
“Euclidean ideal” (Schaffner 2008) of science, according to which 
knowledge is arranged in closed deductive axiomatic systems with 
strict law statements as the axioms. How, they ask, would the phi-
losophy of science look if this formal gestalt, which had already 
worn quite thin in places, were replaced by a more material, mecha-
nistic, gestalt: one emphasizing the causal structures that scientists 
much more frequently discuss (see Craver 2002)?  Seeing the mech-
anistic project in this light leads one to ask, as Bert Leuridan (2010) 
does in a recent paper in Philosophy of Science, whether mecha-
nisms can really replace laws at the heart of our thinking about sci-
ence. 
 Leuridan believes they cannot. In this paper, we assess his 
arguments. Though his arguments, as we show below, leave one 
with no compelling reason to maintain the traditional view, his dis-
cussion demonstrates the need for greater clarity about the place of 
laws in mechanistic sciences.  
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But first the ground rule: All parties to this discussion, as 
Leuridan points out, agree that the traditional notion of a “strict 
law,” the universally quantified material conditional with unrestrict-
ed scope and a good deal besides, has little application in biology 
and other special sciences. Mechanists have openly embraced a 
number of arguments for this conclusion, most notably John Beat-
ty’s (1995) suggestion that the laws of biology are evolutionarily 
contingent and Stuart Glennan’s (1996, 2002) idea that the generali-
zations of biology are mechanistically fragile, and so probabilistic 
and prone to breakdown. Other mechanists emphasize that theoreti-
cal claims in biology are typically limited in scope, applying only to 
some species and strains (cf. Hull 1978), and that the scope of such 
generalizations is restricted to life on earth in a particular epoch (cf. 
Smart 1963). Whatever the reason, mechanists have been happy to 
echo these criticisms as evidence of the limited applicability of the 
traditional law-based view to the philosophy of biology. But contra 
Leuridan’s suggestion, it should also be noted that the mechanist’s 
general opposition to strict laws does not entail opposition to the 
idea that biologists and other scientists of the middle range seek to 
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learn about and describe general facts. None of these arguments 
showing that the idea of a strict law distorts crucial features of biol-
ogy shows that there are no general facts about biology or that gen-
eralizations play no important role in biological research practice. 
And no mechanist has ever made such claims. 
Though we proceed by criticizing Leuridan’s arguments, we 
have a larger purpose, namely, to illustrate how thinking about 
mechanisms enriches and transforms the philosophical debate about 
the role of laws in biology. In our view, the debate over whether or 
not there are laws in biology has outlived its usefulness. Nobody an-
ymore denies that there are stable regularities that afford prediction, 
explanation, and control of biological phenomena. Whether such 
stable regularities count as laws depends on what one requires of 
laws, but it is undeniable that generalizations of this sort do many 
kinds of work in biology. What remains is the admittedly difficult 
work of showing how this is possible. If one takes the biological sci-
ences to be largely dedicated to the search for mechanisms, in con-
trast, one can begin to ask in relatively precise ways how generaliza-
tion contributes to the search for mechanisms and, conversely, what 
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the idea of mechanism brings to long-standing questions about how 
generalizations afford prediction, explanation and control. 
We begin by clarifying Leuridan’s thesis and his central on-
tological and epistemological arguments (Section 2). In Section 3 we 
consider Leuridan’s ontological claims and argue that Leuridan fails 
to show that mechanisms must involve regularities (Section 3.1 and 
3.2) or that there must be fundamental laws without underlying 
mechanisms (Section 3.3). Despite the emphasis Leuridan places on 
the notion of projection (i.e., extrapolation), he fails to explain why 
the generalizations of biology are stable and why certain facts can be 
extrapolated while others cannot (Section 3.1). We show further how 
the mechanistic perspective provides new resources to ameliorate 
these extrapolation problems. In Section 4 we turn to the epistemo-
logical issues. We reject Leuridan’s claim that mechanistic models 
must contain law statements, and we show how mechanistic 
knowledge contributes to the search for stable generalizations. We 
conclude that continued debates over whether mechanisms can re-
place generalizations are likely to be unproductive. We conclude, 
second, that by taking a mechanistic stance, one gains a new vantage 
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point on old problems about laws and a view to new problems about 
the construction, evaluation, and revision of models of biological 
mechanisms. 
 
2. Leuridan’s Thesis 
 In his title, Leuridan asks, “Can mechanisms really replace 
laws of nature?” He answers, “No”. In fact, Leuridan’s positive the-
sis is much weaker than this title suggests.  
 Before formulating this weaker claim, it is necessary first to 
clear up some terminology. Leuridan defines laws as “generaliza-
tion[s] describing a regularity, not some metaphysical entity that 
produces or is responsible for that regularity” (2010, fn 1). This def-
inition ignores three traditional distinctions that have brought much-
needed clarity to the discussions of laws in the philosophy science. 
First, we distinguish laws (metaphysical entities that produce or are 
responsible for regularities) and law-statements (descriptions of 
laws). If one does not respect this distinction, one runs the risk (as 
Leuridan does) of unintentionally suggesting that sentences, equa-
tions, or models are responsible for the fact that certain stable regu-
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larities hold. In like fashion, we distinguish regularities, which are 
statistical patterns of dependence and independence among magni-
tudes, from generalizations, which describe regularities. Finally, we 
distinguish regularities from laws, which produce or are otherwise 
explain the patterns of dependence and independence among magni-
tudes (or so one might hold). 
 Let us now reconstruct Leuridan’s real thesis. First, Leuridan 
endorses the ground-rule of our discussion. Strict law statements, as 
Leuridan understands them, are nonvacuous, universally quantified, 
and exceptionless statements that are unlimited in scope, apply in all 
times and places, and contain only purely qualitative predicates 
(2010, 318). Noting that few law-statements in any science live up to 
these standards, Leuridan argues that the focus on strict law state-
ments (and presumably also on strict laws) is unhelpful for under-
standing science. Instead, he focuses on the concept of a pragmatic 
law (or p-law). Following Sandra Mitchell (1997, 2000, 2003, 
2009), Leuridan understands p-law statements as descriptions of sta-
ble and strong regularities that that can be used to predict, explain, 
and manipulate phenomena. A regularity is stable in proportion to 
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the range of conditions under which it continues to hold and to the 
size of the space-time region in which it holds (2010, 325). A regu-
larity is strong if it is deterministic or frequent. P-law statements 
need not satisfy the criteria for strict law statements. Thus, 
Leuridan’s question is not whether mechanisms can replace laws, 
simpliciter. Rather it is whether mechanisms can replace p-laws and, 
correlatively, whether descriptions of mechanisms can replace p-law 
statements in our thinking about science. 
 Yet Leuridan’s thesis is narrower still. He distinguishes two 
“kinds” of mechanism: complex system mechanisms (cs-
mechanisms) and Salmon/Railton mechanisms. Leuridan character-
izes cs-mechanisms as stable configurations of robust objects that 
produce stable behaviors (2010, 319; see also Glennan 2002, 344-
46).1 Leuridan does not define Salmon/Railton mechanisms, except 
                                                            
1 The full passage is: “Contrary to Salmon/Dowe mechanisms, 
complex systems mechanisms (cs-mechanisms) are robust and sta-
ble. They form stable configurations of robust objects, and as a 
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to say that they involve causal processes and causal interactions 
(2010, 319). However, if we follow Glennan, they might be under-
stood as “sequences of interconnected events” or “a chain or web of 
events leading to a particular event” such as: “a boy hit a baseball; 
the baseball ricocheted off the tree and crashed into the window” 
(Glennan 2002, 345). Salmon/Railton mechanisms are singular 
causal chains. Substituting into Leuridan’s title question yields 
something closer to the question he in fact addresses: “Can cs-
mechanisms really replace p-laws?” Leuridan is not always clear to 
distinguish this ontological question from its epistemological twin: 
“Can models of cs-mechanisms replace p-law statements?”2 But in 
either case, he concludes they cannot. 
                                                                                                                                        
whole they have stable dispositions: the overall behaviors of these 
mechanisms.” (Leuridan 2010, 319) 
2 On closer inspection, Leuridan’s question is still too imprecise 
since it does not specify the purpose for which cs-mechanisms are 
intended to replace p-laws (or vice versa). Mechanisms and stable 
generalizations serve many functions in our thinking about science. 
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More precisely, Leuridan presents four theses, two of which 
he describes as ontological, and two of which he describes as epis-
temological: 
 
First, [cs-] mechanisms are ontologically dependent on stable 
regularities. There are no [cs-]mechanisms without both 
macrolevel and microlevel stable regularities. [L1] 
Second, there may be stable regularities without any underly-
ing [cs-]mechanism. [L2] 
Third, models of [cs-]mechanisms are epistemologically de-
pendent on pragmatic laws. To adequately model a [cs-
]mechanism, one has to incorporate pragmatic laws. [L3].  
Finally, pragmatic laws are themselves not epistemologically 
dependent on mechanistic models. They need not always re-
fer to a mechanism underlying the regularity at hand. [L4] 
(2010, 318-19) 
 
                                                                                                                                        
Perhaps mechanisms are useful for some philosophical purposes and 
laws are useful for others. 
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We have inserted the qualification to cs-mechanisms specifically, 
given that Leuridan offers no argument even purporting to show that 
non-cs-mechanisms are dependent upon p-laws (see Bogen 2005, 
2008), a gap to which we return below. Leuridan argues that cs-
mechanisms cannot replace p-laws in our thinking about the ontolo-
gy of science because cs-mechanisms are ontologically dependent 
on p-laws (L1) but the opposite is not the case (L2). Furthermore, he 
claims that cs-mechanisms cannot replace p-laws in our thinking 
about epistemology because models of cs-mechanisms are 
epistemically dependent on p-laws (L3) and not vice versa (L4).  
 Before we address Leuridan’s arguments, it is necessary first 
to set the record straight.  When Leuridan asks “Can cs-mechanisms 
really replace p-laws?” the word “really” suggests that somebody 
has claimed that they can. Is this true? Do mechanists really insist 
that scientists can discover, explain, predict, and control the action 
potential, heredity, long-term potentiation, natural selection, and 
neurotransmitter release (to name a just few of the lengthy examples 
that mechanists have discussed) without forming generalizations 
about them? Do mechanists think that the Hodgkin-Huxley model of 
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the action potential, the theory of evolution by natural selection, and 
the current models of long-term potentiation and neurotransmitter 
release make no appeal to regular occurrences? In a word, no. They 
are quite explicit on this matter (see for instance Bechtel and Rich-
ardson 2010, 232; Glennan 1996, 52; 2002, 345; Machamer, Darden 
and Craver, 2000, 3, 7; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, fn. 1, 437; 
Craver 2007, Ch. 3, 233-34). James Bogen (2005), the mechanist 
most critical the role of generalizations and regularities in our think-
ing about causation, stresses at great length the importance of 
Mitchell’s treatment of p-law statements (and the regularities they 
describe). He also emphasizes the many epistemic roles that general-
izations play in the search for mechanisms (cf. Bogen 2005, 401): 
(a) to describe the phenomenon to be explained; 
(b) to suggest and sharpen questions about causal mechanisms; 
(c) to describe constraints on acceptable mechanistic models; 
(d) to measure or calculate quantities relevant to the mechanism; 
(e) to support inductive inferences without which mechanisms 
could not  successfully be studied; 
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(f) to support extrapolation of mechanistic knowledge to new 
cases; 
(g) to design effective experiments to test mechanisms; 
(h) to simulate the behavior of mechanisms. 
The list could no doubt go on. In short, no mechanist denies that bi-
ologists search for regularities and routinely formulate generaliza-
tions (p-law statements) that can be used for prediction, explanation, 
and control of phenomena. Indeed, it is hard to see how any signifi-
cant human activity could be pursued without discovering and repre-
senting (in some sense) such regularities. The mechanist claims 
simply that it is useful to ask further about the material structures 
that generalizations describe, and about how this affects the various 
tasks scientists perform. In many areas of science, scientists seek to 
describe mechanisms in order to explain, predict, and control phe-
nomena. If one places the idea of mechanism at the center of one’s 
thinking about those sciences, one suddenly sees p-laws in a new 
light, with new roles to play (compare Bogen’s list to Leuridan’s 
emphasis on prediction, explanation, and control). The question is 
not whether biological phenomena operate in accordance with p-
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laws or exhibit p-regularities, but rather how the search for those 
regularities fits into the central aim of describing mechanisms. 
 
3. The Ontology of Mechanisms 
Let us now consider Leuridan’s argument that p-laws are on-
tologically fundamental to cs-mechanisms. He argues for two com-
ponent theses (2010, 329): 
(a) There can be no cs-mechanism without some stable behavior 
produced by that mechanism (Leuridan calls this the 
“macrolevel regularity”); and 
(b) There can be no cs-mechanism without some regular behav-
iors, operations, or activities displayed by or engaged in by 
the mechanism’s component parts (Leuridan calls these 
“microlevel regularities”). 
Given Leuridan’s definition of a cs-mechanism (cf. 2010, 
319; see also Section 2), (a) is a tautology: “There can be no stable 
configurations of robust objects that produce stable behaviors with-
out some stable behavior produced by that mechanism.” We agree. 
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Surprisingly, Leuridan offers historical evidence to shore up 
his case. “In the life sciences,” he writes, “reference to mechanisms 
cannot be detached from matters of projectability.” (2010, 329) For 
example, he notes, Thomas H. Morgan intended his work on the 
mechanisms of heredity in Drosophila (see Morgan et al. 1915), 
work summarized in a book aptly titled The Mechanisms of 
Mendelian Heredity, to apply outside of the laboratory and to other 
organisms as well.  
Mechanists deny neither that Morgan sought projectable gen-
eralizations nor that he succeeded in finding them. However, a 
mechanist might well insist that scientists sometimes seek details 
about a particular causal mechanism without any interest in general-
izing to other cases. Evolutionary biologists might describe the 
mechanisms that increased the prevalence of a single adaptive trait 
in a population or that produced a single speciation event. Epidemi-
ologists might be interested in how AIDS first came to South Korea. 
Archeologists might be interested in the origins of maize cultivation 
in North America. Ecologists might be interested in the mechanisms 
causing fish populations to dwindle in the Chesapeake Bay. Morgan 
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was interested in generality, we grant, but sometimes scientists just 
want to know how some particular event came to pass, and so they 
describe the particular mechanism that is responsible.  
Bogen (2005, 2008) argues persuasively that the concept of 
causation (understood in terms of “causally productive activities” 
(2008, 112)) and the concept of regularity can (and do) come apart 
from one another.3 We have no difficulty imagining quite irregular 
mechanisms, such as the mechanisms of neurotransmitter release, 
that work roughly ten percent of the time, or a rusty chainsaw that 
starts arbitrarily infrequently. What matters for the existence of a 
mechanism is not how frequently it runs in the limit, but how it 
works when it works, however infrequently. Viewed from this per-
spective, singular, unrepeated causal chains (so-called one-off 
                                                            
3 Leuridan mentions Bogen’s work, but rejects it summarily on the 
ground that Bogen’s criticism of regularism relies on a strict (i.e., 
universal) notion of ‘regularity’ (see 2010, 330). But this is false. 
Bogen frames his discussion in terms of Mitchell’s view of generali-
zations. 
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mechanisms or Salmon/Railton mechanisms) are a special, limiting 
case of cs-mechanisms, not something altogether different. While 
Leuridan’s thesis that there can be no cs-mechanisms without some 
stable behavior produced by that mechanism (cf. 2010, 330) is tauto-
logically true, Leuridan’s unqualified thesis that “there are no mech-
anisms without… macrolevel… stable regularities” (2010, 318; our 
emphasis) is clearly false. One-off mechanisms are mechanisms 
without a macrolevel regularity. So much for the ontological claim. 
 
3.1 Extrapolation of Generalizations 
Things look a bit more promising if we reconstruct 
Leuridan’s projectability thesis as a purely epistemic thesis. Morgan 
wanted to apply what he learned about the mechanisms of heredity 
by studying Drosophila in the lab both to flies outside the lab and to 
other species. Surely the mechanist owes some kind of story about 
how this is possible. The clear solution, one might think, is to recog-
nize that there are laws – however exception-ridden, probabilistic, 
and mechanistically fragile – that license this application. And one 
might insist that Morgan referred to, and indeed formulated, Men-
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del’s second law while making a career of discovering exceptions to 
independent assortment (see Allen 1978; Darden 1991). Scientists 
form generalizations, and then they use those generalizations to say 
what will happen in new cases. Of course, no mechanist denies that 
induction and extrapolation (or projection) are important to science. 
But how are p-laws supposed to help with this task? If p-laws are 
merely law statements, as Leuridan defines them, then they are 
clearly not the kind of thing that can explain why a given regularity 
is stable and strong. Law statements express that, but do not explain 
why, certain regularities are stable and strong. It seems we must un-
derstand Leuridan to mean that stable p-regularities themselves (ra-
ther than descriptions of p-regularities) are necessary for one to ex-
trapolate mechanistic knowledge. Here, in full, is Leuridan’s 
discussion of stability: “What are the conditions on which the regu-
larity under study is contingent? How spatiotemporally stable are 
these conditions? And what is the relationship between the regularity 
and its conditions (is it deterministic, probabilistic, etc.?)” (2010, 
325). Given that stability is defined in terms of the range of circum-
stances in which a generalization holds, the epistemological thesis 
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that extrapolation to conditions outside of the laboratory and to con-
ditions in other organisms requires p-regularities, again, amounts to 
a tautology: if the regularities discovered about Drosophila in the 
laboratory are to hold outside of the laboratory and for other organ-
isms, then there must be organisms outside of the laboratory for 
which the regularity holds. If a regularity holds only in Morgan’s la-
boratory or only for Drosophila, then there is nothing outside of the 
laboratory or in other organisms about which to extrapolate. But this 
is not an explanation of why knowledge extrapolates beyond the la-
boratory; it is simply a claim that it does extrapolate outside the la-
boratory. Put this point another way: by helping himself to the idea 
of p-laws, which are by definition stable regularities, Leuridan does 
nothing to explain why certain facts can be extrapolated and others 
cannot. Nor does he tell us how to discern which features of a sys-
tem can be extrapolated from those that cannot. Rather, by invoking 
the idea of a p-law, he merely asserts that there is a distinction be-
tween knowledge that can be extrapolated and knowledge that can-
not be extrapolated. But the bald statement that there is a difference 
between the predicates that project and those that do not, conditions 
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that project and those that do not, and times when the consequent re-
ally ought to obtain and times when it shouldn’t, is not a victory for 
p-laws, but simply an assertion that a central problem for any theory 
of p-laws has a solution.  
Let’s push a bit deeper. For a defender of strict laws, which 
by definition apply always, without exception, and without limita-
tion of scope, it is reasonably clear how knowledge of the laws 
would warrant extrapolation. For a defender of a robust metaphysi-
cal notion of a law, where a law is part of the structure of the world 
that explains (rather than merely describes) the p-regularities we ob-
serve, then knowledge of the laws would presumably warrant ex-
trapolation. But Leuridan weakens the notion of a law so that p-laws 
are mere regularities and p-law statements are descriptions of these 
regularities; further, such descriptions are non-universal, have ex-
ceptions, and apply only in restricted regions of space-time. In ef-
fect, he turns p-laws into imperfect regularities with no robust meta-
physical backing. Whether such a weakened p-law warrants 
extrapolation outside of the laboratory depends upon whether one in 
fact finds that the regularity continues to hold outside of the labora-
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tory, whether the necessary background conditions hold, whether the 
target instance under consideration is one of the exceptions or 
whether it is not. P-laws, as Leuridan understands them, might not 
warrant extrapolation. The laws might hold only in Morgan’s labora-
tory, after all. At the very least, if one believes that p-laws offer a so-
lution to the problem of extrapolation, then one owes a further story 
about how one knows when the conditions for extrapolating the reg-
ularity have been met. Leuridan offers no such story. 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005), whom Leuridan picks out 
for particular criticism on this matter, argue on independent grounds 
that it is philosophically unfruitful to think about the problem of 
generalization (or extrapolation, in Leuridan’s vocabulary)4 in terms 
of laws. In a section of their paper called “Generalizing without 
Laws” they criticize law-based views of generalization and develop 
                                                            
4 One might distinguish generalization (i.e. expanding the scope of 
the schema within a species/class) from extrapolation (i.e. expanding 
the scope of the schema beyond the species/class). Given that the 
parties to this dispute do not draw this distinction we treat them as 
synonymous.  
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an alternative, prototype-based account. Because Leuridan does not 
mention these arguments, we repeat them here. They argue that if 
one thinks of biologists as attempting to build law statements, para-
digmatically represented in terms of material conditionals, then it is 
difficult to understand the prototypical structure of biological theo-
ries. One is tempted to think of biologists as constructing, for exam-
ple, a law-statement of heredity (such as Mendel’s laws). When one 
encounters variation in that mechanism (as Morgan did), one is 
tempted to package the variation into the antecedent of the condi-
tional. In fact, however, one finds that biologists typically character-
ize a mechanism in a particular strain of a particular species (such as 
wild-type Drosophila) and then recognize that there will be subtle 
variations on that mechanism in other strains, mutants, and species. 
They are not looking for general law statements that cover all of 
them, but rather for sets of prototypical models that stand in family 
resemblance relations to one another (cf. Schaffner 1993). To push 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s point one step further: Prototype models 
need not be general descriptions. Bechtel and Abrahamsen also call 
their view an “exemplar” (2005, 438) account, noting that models of 
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mechanisms often describe a particular, exemplary case. (Open a bi-
ology textbook and look at some diagrams of mechanisms; more of-
ten than not, they are cartoons of a single representative mecha-
nism.) On such an exemplar view, generalization is extrinsic to the 
mechanistic models (exemplars, prototypes); that is, the model need 
not contain general statements or general representations at all.5 
Leuridan’s insistence that the model must contain such things is 
simply the imposition of a philosophical prejudice onto actual scien-
tific models that have the capacity rather to surprise us if only we 
open our eyes to them.  The generality of such a mechanistic model 
is a matter of its scope of application and not something that must be 
represented within the model itself. If one attempts to put the gener-
ality in the model itself, to return to Bechtel and Abrahamsen’s 
point, the model has difficulty accommodating the variability char-
acteristic of biological mechanisms. 
                                                            
5 This view fits with the semantic view of theories that Bechtel and 
Richardson embrace (cf. 2010, 232). 
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Curiously, Leuridan fails to consider the possibility that most 
p-regularities are stable and strong because they are produced or 
maintained by mechanisms (see, for example, Bechtel 2009; Craver 
2007; Darden and Craver 2002; Glennan 2010; Steel 2008; Wimsatt 
1998). Why might Morgan have expected the apparent exceptions to 
Mendelian heredity he discovered in his lab to apply outside of the 
lab and in other organisms? The simple answer is this: He expected 
the mechanisms of heredity outside the lab and in other organisms to 
be more or less similar to the hereditary mechanisms at work in his 
Drosophila. The p-laws of heredity are stable and strong precisely 
because there is an underlying mechanism (involving, e.g., crossing 
over and replication of chromosomes) that explains them.  
In his book Across the Boundaries (2008) Daniel Steel builds 
on early suggestions by Darden and Craver (2002) to develop an 
elaborate analysis of how one can extrapolate scientific knowledge 
based on an understanding of the relevant mechanisms. The idea be-
hind his “comparative process tracing” (Steel 2008, 85) approach is 
simple and helpful: First, one uses a variety of strategies to learn 
about the mechanism in the model organism. Second, one compares 
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the mechanism in the model organism to the mechanism of the 
extrapolational target at certain key junctures. That is, one compares 
the two mechanisms at stages at which the mechanisms are most 
likely to differ significantly from one another.  The fewer significant 
differences one discovers at these key points, the stronger is the ba-
sis for the extrapolation. Crucially, one need not compare all of the 
entities, activities, and organizational features of a mechanism to 
those in the target organism in order to assess the likelihood that 
one’s extrapolation will work: one might, for example, compare 
downstream (rather than upstream) portions of a mechanism, given 
that crucial differences downstream will indicate crucial differences 
earlier. Conversely, similarity at a key bottle-neck point in the 
mechanism might allow one to neglect any differences upstream in 
the mechanism to focus on what comes later (see Steel 2008, 90). 
Furthermore, if one is interested simply in gross qualitative differ-
ences, such as whether a given drug is positively relevant for a side-
effect or negatively relevant for a side-effect, certain minute and 
highly-specific differences in the mechanisms might be less germane 
than the simple matter of whether there is a positive (excitatory) or 
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negative (inhibitory) causal or correlational relationship in the model 
organism. Thinking about underlying mechanisms, in short, provides 
new tools for assessing when our knowledge is likely to extrapolate 
and when extrapolation is more precarious.  
 Steel’s strategies rely primarily on considering the mecha-
nisms that underlie a regularity, but one might also justify extrapola-
tion on the basis of antecedent mechanisms, such as the mechanism 
of natural selection. That is, one might claim that the hereditary 
mechanisms in Drosophila can be expected to apply outside of the 
laboratory and in other species because hereditary mechanisms are 
evolutionarily ancient and therefore widely conserved across the tree 
of life. As Bechtel (2009) argues, this mechanistic fact about the his-
tory of life warrants tentative (heuristic) extrapolation about closely 
related species: they might use the same mechanism, or a mecha-
nism composed of similar entities and activities, or mechanisms with 
similar organizational structures. And one might expect evolution-
arily ancient mechanisms to be more widely conserved, and so more 
fitting for extrapolation, than are relatively recent adaptations. This 
kind of heuristic is especially interesting in the present context given 
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that, according to this heuristic, a singular mechanism (the one-off 
mechanism that produced the tree of life as we now know it) war-
rants extrapolation of p-laws in extant species. 
While we admit that these mechanistic contributions to our 
understanding of extrapolation solve neither the problem of induc-
tion nor Goodman’s new riddle of induction (1955), we insist they 
nonetheless have considerably more content than the bare assertion 
that p-laws warrant extrapolation because they are stable and strong. 
Indeed, extrapolation is at least often justified by appeal to 
knowledge of mechanisms. In sum, it appears that our epistemic re-
formulation of Leuridan’s argument runs into a dilemma. Either his 
claim is a tautology to the effect that mechanisms must be general if 
one is to form true generalizations about them, or it is a substantive 
epistemological thesis that extrapolation is possible only if there are 
p-laws. If the latter, then we have shown how Leuridan begs the 
question by presuming, rather than showing, that p-laws solve the 
extrapolation problem and by asserting, rather than defending, the 
disputed thesis that p-laws are required for extrapolation. Most im-
portantly, however, we have reviewed some of the progress mecha-
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nists have made in thinking about the problem of extrapolation. Fo-
cusing on mechanisms provides fruitful and substantive ways of 
thinking about how generalizations are extrapolated in scientific 
practice. It is unclear why Leuridan refuses the mechanist’s help in 
addressing the extrapolation problem.  
 
3.2 Do cs-mechanisms require micro-regularities? 
Let us move on, then, to the second route (b) by which 
Leuridan argues that cs-mechanisms are ontologically dependent on 
stable regularities (L1). Leuridan claims: “There can be no cs-
mechanism without some lower-level (c)P-regularities (i.e., the 
regular behaviors, operations, or activities displayed or engaged in 
by the mechanism’s parts).” (2010, 331) A (c)P-regularity is a causal 
p-law, a P-law that that is “invariant under some range of interven-
tions” (2010, 328). Leuridan argues for this thesis using a thought 
experiment. If the behaviors of all of the parts of the mechanism 
were to behave completely randomly, by which he means that they 
do what they do as the result of a “completely random internal pro-
cess”, “this would make it very unlikely to produce a macro-p-
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regularity, let alone a (c)P regularity” (2010, 331).6 What shall we 
make of this argument? 
Clearly, Leuridan’s thought experiment does not support the 
ontological conclusion that there can be no cs-mechanisms without 
some p-regularities among the parts. At most, it supports a probabil-
istic conclusion that cs-mechanisms are unlikely without p-
regularities, and such an argument cannot support the negated exis-
                                                            
6 It should be noted that Leuridan defines “irregularity“ in such a 
way as to effectively exclude discussion of stochastic mechanisms, 
mechanisms that work only infrequently or whose frequency of op-
eration and stability in space vary over time. A mechanism that 
works with probability 0.000001 will count as regular on Leuridan’s 
account because one can write a generalization of the form P(X) = 
0.000001. This is unfortunate as there are a number of interesting 
questions that one might ask about probablistic mechanisms and 
mechanisms whose probability of working varies over time (as one 
might expect in systems that are regulated). Thanks to Jim Bogen for 
calling this to our attention.  
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tential quantifier in Leuridan’s second ontological claim (b). The 
thesis that x is unlikely to have property F is consistent with the 
claim that x is F and, for non-zero probabilities, entails that x is pos-
sibly F (directly contradicting Leuridan’s stated thesis). Although 
randomly behaving components such as those in Leuridan’s example 
would not form a mechanism (given that the behavior of each is 
causally independent of the behaviors of the others), it is still possi-
ble that together they would produce a regularity, even a (c)P-
regularity, of some stability and strength. Just how improbable this 
would be depends upon the number of variables and the number of 
values they might take. In order to make experimental progress in 
the discovery of causes and mechanisms, we regularly presume that 
regularities do not arise merely from chance. However, as the statis-
tics attached to any causal experiment acknowledge, there is always 
some non-zero probability that the results of the experiment did arise 
strictly from chance. Now if macro regularities can obtain even 
among causally unconnected random events (as in Leuridan’s exam-
ple), then why would one ever suppose that it would be impossible 
for them to obtain among causally connected random events (what-
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ever sense we can make of that notion)?7 It seems there is no inter-
pretation of the idea of irregularly behaving components that sus-
tains even the negative existential thesis entailed by Leuridan’s 
modal claim that no (c)P-regularity can be produced by irregularly 
behaving components.  
Perhaps what Leuridan means to claim is that very few of the 
mechanisms described in biology textbooks explain higher-level 
(c)P-regularities without appealing to regularly behaving compo-
nents. If one wants to discuss the kinds of mechanism that biologists 
typically study, then one must acknowledge that there are true p-
generalizations about the components of mechanisms. True enough. 
But this claim is entirely independent of the ontological thesis that 
cs-mechanisms depend on lower-level regularities. And no mecha-
nist denies that there are true p-generalizations about the compo-
nents of mechanisms. 
                                                            
7 Again, note that Leuridan is operating with a most unorthodox no-
tion of ‘irregularity’. 
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If the argument does not work for cs-mechanisms, it certainly 
will not work for mechanisms in general (as his title and introduc-
tion suggest). That is, it cannot establish, as Leuridan claims, that 
there can be no mechanisms without microlevel stable regularities. It 
seems one-off mechanisms (the ‘Salmon/Railton mechanisms’ dis-
cussed above) might well work without micro-level stable regulari-
ties. Such mechanisms probably wouldn’t be so scientifically inter-
esting, and we might never know about them, but they might well 
exist. 
Leuridan might, at this point, have entered a long debate 
about the regular character of causality. Perhaps he could endorse 
the view that the components in a mechanism can properly be said to 
causally interact with one another only if there exists a p-regularity 
relating events of one type to events of another type.  If all mecha-
nisms have interacting parts, and if there can be no interactions 
among parts without p-regularities, then there can be no mechanisms 
without p-regularities. That’s certainly an ontological thesis, and it’s 
one with a grand tradition. It’s also a view that some mechanists 
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(such as Bogen 2005, 2008; Machamer 2004; Darden 2006) explicit-
ly challenge.  
As we mentioned above, Bogen (2005, 2008) argues that 
causation and regularity are conceptually distinct. One set of 
Bogen’s arguments turns on the implicit thesis that causation is local 
(or, in other words, intrinsic): that whether A causes B depends on 
facts about A, B, and their relation to one another, and does not de-
pend on how other A-type things and B-type things behave when 
they interact. What matters instead is whether A and B are connect-
ed by some determinate sort of activity. One need not buy the meta-
physics of activities to appreciate the intuitive pull of locality. Imag-
ine a world composed only of two billiard-balls traveling through 
space-time toward one another until one day they clack together and 
fly back in the directions whence they came. Whether they interact-
ed would seem not to depend on whether any other billiard balls ev-
er meet, or on whether the same billiard balls ever meet again; nei-
ther is true in the world we are considering. The causal interaction is 
a fact about them and them alone (that is, an intrinsic feature of their 
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interaction); nobody else matters, and so no p-regularity (or any reg-
ularity) matters, to whether they interact.  
A second kind of argument for the separability of regularity 
and causation turns on the possibility of causal relations that have no 
echo in the correlational structure of the world. For example, one 
might have a mutation that reduces the overall chance that one will 
get lung cancer (that is, the mutation has negative statistical rele-
vance for cancer) but that, in a few unfortunate individuals, is, in 
fact, the trigger for lung cancer. And one might get lung cancer in 
virtue of having that mutation. One might smoke three packs a day 
(raising the chance of getting lung cancer) and in fact get lung can-
cer because of the mutation. The actual causal structure in such cas-
es would appear to run counter to the regularities. To borrow a kind 
of example first described by Jonathan Schaffer (2000), we might 
imagine two neurons, A and B, synapsing on a third neuron, C. Sup-
pose we know from experimental investigation that the probability 
of C’s firing given A’s firing alone is 0.5, that the probability of C’s 
firing given B’s firing alone is 0.5, and that the probability of spon-
taneous firing in C is 0. Now suppose that A, B, and C all fire. These 
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facts leave the causal facts under-determined. For in this situation, it 
might be that A caused C to fire, that B caused C to fire, or that both 
A and B caused C to fire. The difference between these possibilities 
cannot, ex hypothesi, depend on the regularities involved. It would 
seem that there is a further fact about the actual causal structure of 
the situation. Regularities, it might be thought, provide evidence 
about the causal structure of a mechanism. But the causal structure 
of the mechanism is something over and above the regularities by 
which that structure can be detected. 
We do not insist on the view that causation is intrinsic, actu-
al, and singular. We simply note that Leuridan does not address the 
heart of the debate about whether regularities are more fundamental 
than causation and mechanisms. Some philosophers, most explicitly 
Glennan (2002), Woodward (2002), and Craver (2007), appear to 
agree (to a first approximation) with the idea that the interactions in 
a mechanism should be characterized in terms of invariant change 
relating generalizations. They stress, for example, that knowledge of 
causes is practically valuable precisely because it is general. And 
they emphasize the close connection between the generality of cau-
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sation and the methods used to test causal relations (see Woodward 
2004). Bogen, we have seen, disagrees. The merits of and relations 
among these approaches have been discussed at some length by 
Craver (2007), Glennan (2002, 2010), Psillos (2004), Tabery (2004) 
and Woodward (2002, 2010). Leuridan again does not address this 
discussion. 
One last point deserves mention before almost leaving 
Leuridan’s putatively ontological discussion. Leuridan distinguishes 
between P-laws and (c)P-laws. This distinction is required for 
Leuridan to distinguish P-laws that are merely useful for prediction 
from those that, in addition, allow one to explain and control events. 
One might predict that one is about to run out of gas by looking at 
one’s gas gauge, but the reading on the gas gauge does not explain 
the emptiness of the tank. Nor could one make it further down the 
road by breaking the gauge. For this reason, Leuridan (like the 
mechanists Glennan (2002) and Craver (2007)) appeals to Wood-
ward’s systematic theory of causation (2003). According to that the-
ory, very roughly, causal regularities are stable regularities that con-
tinue to hold when one intervenes to change the cause variable. This 
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view of (c)P-regularities, however, depends fundamentally on the 
idea of an intervention. It also depends on the notion of an ideal in-
tervention, which is one that intervenes via some causal paths and 
not others. It also depends on a thesis of modularity: that it is possi-
ble to intervene independently on the different components of a 
mechanism. As Woodward acknowledges time and again, this view 
of the semantics of causal claims is not intended as a reductive, met-
aphysical analysis of the notion of cause. It would be circular as 
such because one requires an antecedent notion of causation to 
ground these features of the account (interventions, uncontrolled 
paths, and modularity). Ironically, a singular notion of causation 
such as Bogen defends might be just what Woodward’s account of 
intervention and modularity need for their metaphysical ground. If 
so, then the claim that (c)P-laws are metaphysically more fundamen-
tal than singular causation would have the story exactly backwards. 
But these are complicated matters that we must leave for now. 
 
3.3  Laws without mechanisms? 
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Above we focus on Leuridan’s claim that cs-mechanisms on-
tologically depend on macrolevel (a) as well as on microlevel (b) 
(c)P-regularities (L1). For the sake of completeness, let us consider 
Leuridan’s second ontological thesis (L2), that there can be (c)P-
regularities without underlying mechanisms. Leuridan needs this se-
cond thesis to establish the desired “ontological asymmetry between 
P-regularities and cs-mechanisms” (2010, 331). In his hands, this 
amounts to the claim that it is possible that there are fundamental 
(c)P-laws, that is, (c)P-laws for which no mechanisms exist. 
Leuridan does not argue for this thesis, but it seems to us at least 
conceivable that the world is structured with fundamental (c)P-laws 
(Glennan (1996, 2002, 2010) embraces this view). To decide wheth-
er this conceivable ontological picture is actual, however, would re-
quire further argument. It is also conceivable that the world has an 
infinite series of mechanisms within mechanisms, or that it grounds 
out ultimately in individual singular causal relations (as Bogen rec-
ommends), or perhaps that it grounds out in occurrent matters of 
fact. Leuridan has no argument to convince us that we are in one of 
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these worlds rather than the other, and we therefore see no compel-
ling reason for a mechanist to take sides.  
 
4. Mechanism and Epistemology 
Let us turn finally to Leuridan’s claim that p-law statements 
are epistemically fundamental to mechanistic models. First, he ar-
gues that explanatory mechanistic models must include p-law state-
ments (L3), and so mechanistic explanation cannot proceed in the 
absence of p-law statements.8 Second, he claims that mechanistic 
knowledge is dispensable in our search for p-laws. For instance, by 
                                                            
8 One might have expected Leuridan to defend the epistemic claim 
that one cannot learn about mechanisms in the absence of p-laws. 
One might hold that one can test causal connections only on the ba-
sis of regularities. Such a claim would be false, of course, as we 
might make causal inferences on the basis of temporal succession or 
spatio-temporal contiguity, for example. Leuridan might claim (cor-
rectly) that such inferences are fallible, but all inductive inferences 
are fallible, including those involving p-laws.  
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using randomized experimental designs, one can control for disturb-
ing mechanistic factors without knowing what they are. This latter 
argument is supposed to show that although (explanatory) mechanis-
tic models are “epistemologically dependent” on p-law statements 
(in the sense that the former require the latter), p-law statements are 
not “epistemologically dependent” on mechanistic knowledge (L4) 
(some p-law statements can be discovered without relying on 
knowledge about mechanisms). Finally, he argues that if our 
knowledge of laws did depend upon knowledge of mechanisms, then 
we would face an “infinite (and vicious) epistemological regress” 
(2010, 333). Because knowledge of mechanisms requires knowledge 
of laws, our knowledge of laws and mechanisms would never 
ground out in fundamental facts. Fortunately, Leuridan claims, we 
can know the p-laws without knowing anything about mechanisms, 
and this blocks the regress. 
Leuridan’s first point about explanatory models derives from 
the above discussion (see Section 3). If cs-mechanisms require (c)P-
laws, then an adequate model of the cs-mechanism requires (c)P-
laws. Above, we reject the antecedent. Given that not all mecha-
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nisms produce a behavior in a regular way (granted, many do) there 
exist cases of one-off mechanisms (Salmon/Railton mechanisms) in 
which the mechanistic model for the irregular behavior necessarily 
involves neither a macro p-law statement nor a micro p-law state-
ment. Similarly, in cases where a mechanism behaves regularly even 
thought this macro regularity is sustained by micro-irregularities, a 
mechanistic model might involve a macro p-law statement but not a 
micro p-law statement.  
But what shall we do about the cases in which biologists ex-
plain a general phenomenon in terms of general facts about compo-
nents and their activities? Mechanists should not, and do not, deny 
the existence of such explanations. Instead, mechanists deny that an 
explanatory model must be formulated in terms of generalizations.9 
                                                            
9 Thus, we deviate from the central thesis Holly Andersen (2011) 
defends in her short response to Leuridan’s paper: “The existence of 
stable regularities in nature is necessary for either model of explana-
tion: regularities are what laws describe and what mechanisms ex-
plain.” (2011: 325). 
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One would think that explanatory models of cs-mechanisms must in-
clude p-law statements if one embraced a covering law (CL) model 
of explanation, according to which explanations are arguments that 
subsume descriptions of events under general law statements. No 
mechanist, however, accepts the CL model of explanation (see espe-
cially Salmon 1984 and Craver 2007). The reasons are too widely 
known to be repeated here; and it would be uncharitable to saddle 
Leuridan with this much-maligned view when he has not explicitly 
endorsed a view on the matter.  
For mechanists, in contrast, mechanistic explanatory models 
have explanatory value in virtue of the fact that they represent the 
relevant portion of the causal structure of the world, not in virtue of 
the fact that they have a canonical representational form. Explanato-
ry models of mechanisms might be diagrams, equations, exemplars, 
prototypes, texts, videos, or what have you. In each case, the repre-
sentational object of the model might be singular or general. What 
makes these models explanatory, to the extent that they are, is that 
they correctly (or approximately) describe the causal structures that 
produce, underlie, or maintain the explanandum phenomenon. Vide-
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os and diagrammatic models, for example, need not include any lin-
guistic expressions or equations (cf. Perini 2005). Exemplar models, 
such as a labeled diagram of a single mechanism working from be-
ginning to end, by their very nature describe representative instances 
rather than general types. The intended scope of the explanatory 
model, in other words, need not be represented in the model itself. 
Once one thoroughly abandons the CL model, there is no justifica-
tion for demanding that explanatory models must include p-law 
statements. Leuridan’s claim that all mechanistic models must in-
clude macro p-law statements, that is, generalizations about the be-
havior of the mechanism, is an unnecessary restriction on mechanis-
tic models that ignores the plain fact that mechanistic models are 
frequently developed without asserting within the model that it can 
be generalized to other phenomena. This narrow focus blinds one (as 
it blinded earlier generations in the philosophy of biology) to the di-
versity of representational forms one finds in science. Mechanists 
such as Salmon (1984) and Craver (2007) have therefore rightly 
separated the question of explanation from the question of how ex-
planatory knowledge is represented. 
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 Let us now consider Leuridan’s second epistemic thesis. For 
the record, we know of no mechanist who insists that one can test p-
law statements only if one relies on prior mechanistic knowledge. 
However, let’s think through Leuridan’s argument. His sole example 
is a randomized clinical drug trial, in which subjects are randomly 
sorted into two groups, one of which is given a drug, and one of 
which is given a placebo. Leuridan perhaps should have acknowl-
edged that the effectiveness of one’s randomization procedure might 
depend upon the mechanism of randomization. What counts as ran-
dom with respect to one experimental situation will not count as 
random with respect to another. Were one to survey the extent of 
homelessness in a geographic region by conducting a poll random-
ized by street address, the mechanism of randomization would be 
systematically biased to target people who have homes. Were one to 
randomize drug trials by zip code, environmental factors could con-
found the results. The procedure would not be random in the rele-
vant respect. What matters is whether the apparent randomization 
procedure is likely to sort participants into two groups that have the 
same distribution of potentially confounding causal factors. Whether 
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the randomization procedure achieves that, depends on assumptions 
about the relevant causal mechanisms at play (even if those assump-
tions are often so obvious as to be not worth mentioning). Likewise, 
Leuridan might have acknowledged that the standard procedure of 
giving placebos to control groups reflects prior knowledge of the 
mechanism of the placebo effect. Indeed, experimenters generally 
take extreme measures to match the experimental and control groups 
in every way that might possibly confound the results. They test for 
missing control conditions by asking whether there is some possible 
difference between the two groups that could plausibly account for 
the observed changes in the result/effect. Background knowledge 
about possible mechanisms is often central to that task. 
 Consider in a bit more detail about how such experiments 
work. A standard experiment for testing a (c)P-law involves inter-
vening into a putative cause variable, C, and detecting from the puta-
tive effect variable, E. Mechanistic details are often crucial for as-
sessing the appropriateness of one’s interventions. As discussed 
briefly above, one wants to ensure that one’s intervention produces 
the effect in E (if any) via C and not via some other mechanism. 
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That is, the intervention should change C. It should not change E di-
rectly. It should not change directly the value of any variable be-
tween C and E. Furthermore, the intervention on C itself should not 
be correlated with any other variable that is a cause of E (unless it is 
causally intermediate between C and E). In some cases, one wants to 
ensure that the intervention severs the causal influences of other var-
iables on C so that one can attribute any change in E to the interven-
tion alone. All of these assumptions behind the use of interventions 
to test (c)P-laws are assumptions about the causal structure, the 
mechanisms, involved in the intervention technique and in the sys-
tem under study. An adequate philosophy of experimental interven-
tion thus might make considerable progress by asking how mecha-
nistic knowledge enters into these test procedures (see Woodward 
2003; see summary diagram in Craver 2007, Ch. 3). 
 What about the detection component of a test for a (c)P-law? 
Allan Franklin (2009) has generated a useful list of strategies by 
which scientists confirm that their techniques are reliable indicators 
of phenomena such as E. Many of these strategies rely crucially on 
facts about the mechanisms at play. One might, for example, argue 
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that there could be no other cause of the measured value of E besides 
the fact that E has that value. One might show that one’s technique 
reliably registers reliable artifacts known to be produced under aber-
rant causal conditions. One might rely on a theoretical understanding 
of the mechanism by which the detection technique works. One 
might check the results of one’s technique against another technique 
that relies on causally independent mechanisms (see Franklin 2009). 
In each of these cases, one relies on knowledge about the mecha-
nisms involved in the system and in the detection technique to argue 
that the methods in question provide an adequate measure of E in 
these circumstances. In short, even if it is possible to test (c)P-laws 
without knowing mechanisms (and we deny that Leuridan’s example 
shows as much), one might learn a great deal about how (c)P-laws 
are tested by thinking about the mechanisms involved in the test 
conditions. By casting the debate as a forced choice between laws 
and mechanisms, one occludes far more interesting questions about 
how mechanistic knowledge contributes to the design and interpreta-
tion of experiments for testing p-laws. 
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Finally, Leuridan claims that if our ability to test (c)P-laws 
relies exclusively on cs-mechanisms, then we face an infinite re-
gress. The regress arises because if cs-mechanistic knowledge relies 
upon knowledge of (c)P-laws (or, more precisely, mechanistic ex-
planations must involve p-law statements), and if knowledge of 
(c)P-laws requires knowledge of cs-mechanisms, then we never 
reach the epistemic bottom. It is not clear to us that this is a well-
formed problem, and so we are not clear how to solve it.10 We 
know of no foundationalist who proposes to build scientific 
knowledge out of the basic building blocks of mechanisms or laws. 
Foundationalists tend to construe the epistemic foundation of sci-
ence in terms of particular matters of fact, sense data, or innate ide-
as, not in terms of p-laws or mechanisms. We think that both p-laws 
and mechanisms contribute to the advancement of science, and we 
                                                            
10 Contrary to Leuridan’s claim, Machamer, Darden, and Craver 
(2000) discuss bottom-out activities not as a way of solving some 
sort of epistemic regress but as a disciplinarily relative way of iden-
tifying when explanations come to an end. 
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feel no pressing need (and have been given no compelling argument) 
to place one above or below the other in the order of our knowledge. 
Furthermore, it is not at all clear from Leuridan’s formulation how 
laws stop the regress. If one must know p-laws in order to adequate-
ly test p-laws (for example, p-law statements that one’s randomiza-
tion procedure regularly randomizes, that one’s interventions work 
the same way each time, and so on), then one still has a regress of 
sorts, and Leuridan has not shown how it will come to an end. How 
can we design a randomized experiment if we cannot trust that our 
randomizing procedure generally randomizes? And how can we con-
trol for confounding factors if there are no general facts about which 
factors are confounding? How do we know that our intervention is 
adequate if there are no general facts about how our intervention 
works?  It would appear that laws are no more epistemically secure 
than are mechanisms in the foundationalist view that Leuridan ap-
parently embraces. 
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5. Conclusion 
For the discussion of these matters to move forward, it is 
crucial not to manufacture an artificial conflict between philosophers 
who emphasize the centrality of mechanisms in our thinking about 
science and philosophers (such as Mitchell) who seek a plausible 
way to talk about generalization in science. No mechanist denies that 
there are pragmatically useful regularities. And nobody who thinks 
there are pragmatically useful regularities should feel any pressure to 
deny that the search for mechanisms is central to the practice of bi-
ology and many other sciences.   
It is a surprising fact about the history of the philosophy of 
science that of these two correlative concepts, generalizations have 
tended to dominate the discussion. Against this backdrop, mecha-
nists should be read as suggesting something of a gestalt-shift in 
which mechanisms are moved into the foreground. Such a shift leads 
attention away from the formal structure of scientific theories (and 
questions about the logical structure of law-statements and models) 
and toward the material structures that scientists endeavor to de-
scribe. Attention to such material structures provides resources for 
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thinking about how generalizations and mechanisms are discovered, 
evaluated, and extrapolated and into how such concepts are de-
ployed in explanation, prediction, and control. The perceived need to 
defend laws, no matter how much they have been weakened and 
stripped of their once-robust metaphysical content, reflects a con-
servative refusal to acknowledge that perhaps the philosophy of sci-
ence might benefit from coming at its subject matter from a fresh 
perspective. Mechanists decenter laws in their thinking about sci-
ence because the old paradigm, centering laws, has become mired in 
debates that are inconsequential and, as a result, have stopped gener-
ating new questions and producing new results. In this paper, we 
have argued that by trying on the mechanistic gestalt, one can make 
progress on problems concerning explanation, laws, prediction, and 
manipulation where the nomic approach seems to have run out of 
gas. Moving forward, there are far more interesting and better-
motivated questions to ask than whether mechanisms can replace 
generalizations or vice versa.  
 
 
55 
References 
Allen, Garland E. 1978. Thomas Hunt Morgan: The Man and His 
Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Andersen, Holly K. 2011. Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities. Phi-
losophy of Science 78: 325-331. 
Beatty, John. 1995. The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis. In Con-
cepts, Theories, and Rationality in the Biological Sciences, 
ed. Gereon Wolters, and James G. Lennox, 45-81. Pitts-
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Bechtel, William. 2009. Generalization and Discovery by Assuming 
Conserved Mechanisms: Cross Species Research on Cir-
cadian Oscillators. Philosophy of Science 76: 762-773. 
Bechtel, William, and Adele Abrahamsen. 2005. Explanation: A 
Mechanist Alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36: 421-441. 
Bechtel, William, and Robert C. Richardson. 2010. Discovering 
Complexity. Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in 
Scientific Research. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
56  
Bogen, James. 2005. Regularities and Causality; Generalizations and 
Causal Explanations. Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36: 397-420. 
— — —. 2008. Causally Productive Activities. Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science 39: 112-123. 
Craver, Carl F. 2007. Explaining the Brain. Mechanisms and the 
Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— — —. (2002) Structures of Scientific Theories. In Blackwell 
Guide to the Philosophy of Science, eds. P.K. Machamer and 
M. Silberstein, 55-79. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Darden, Lindley. 1991. Theory Change in Science: Strategies from 
Mendelian Genetics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
— — —. 2006. Reasoning in Biological Discoveries: Essays on 
Mechanisms, Interfield Relations, and Anomaly Resolution. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Darden, Lindley, and Carl F. Craver. 2002. Strategies in the Inter-
field Discovery of the Mechanism of Protein Synthesis. Stud-
ies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences 33: 1-28. 
57 
Franklin, Allan. 2009. Experiment in Physics. The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/physics-
experiment/>. 
Goodman, Nelson. 1955. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Glennan, Stuart S. 1996. Mechanism and the Nature of Causation. 
Erkenntnis 44: 49-71.  
— — —. 2002. Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation. Philosophy of 
Science 69: 342-353. 
— — —. 2010. Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the 
World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81: 362-
381. 
Hull, David L. 1978. A Matter of Individuality. Philosophy of Sci-
ence 45: 335-360. 
Leuridan, Bert. 2010. Can Mechanisms Really Replace Laws of Na-
ture?  Philosophy of Science 77: 317-340. 
58  
Machamer, Peter. 2004. Activities and Causation: The Metaphysics 
and Epistemology of Mechanisms. International Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science 18: 27-39. 
Machamer, Peter, Lindley Darden, and Carl F. Craver. 2000. Think-
ing About Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 67: 1-25. 
Mitchell, Sandra D. 1997. Pragmatic Laws. Philosophy of Science 
64 (Proceedings): 468-479. 
— — —. 2000. Dimensions of Scientific Law. Philosophy of Sci-
ence 67: 242-265. 
— — —. 2003. Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
— — —. 2009. Unsimple Truths. Science, Complexity, and Policy. 
Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. 
Morgan, Thomas H., Alfred Sturtevant, Hermann Muller, and Calvin 
Bridges. 1915. The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity. New 
York: Henry Holt and Company. 
Perini, Laura. 2005. Explanation in Two Dimensions: Diagrams and 
Biological Explanation. Biology and Philosophy 20: 257-
269. 
59 
Psillos, Stathis. 2004. A Glimpse of the Secret Connection: Harmo-
nizing Mechanisms with Counterfactuals. Perspectives on 
Science 12: 288-319. 
Salmon, Wesley. 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Struc-
ture of the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2000. Causation by Disconnection. Philosophy 
of Science 67: 285-300. 
Schaffner, Kenneth F. 1993. Discovery and Explanation in Biology 
and Medicine. Chicago/London: University of Chicago 
Press. 
— — —. 2008. Theories, Models, and Equations in Biology: The 
Heuristic Search for Emergent Simplifications in Neurobiol-
ogy. Philosophy of Science 75: 1008-1021. 
Smart, J.J.C. 1963. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: 
Routledge. 
Steel, Daniel P. 2008. Across the Boundaries. Extrapolation in Biol-
ogy and Social Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tabery, James G. 2004. Synthesizing Activities and Interactions in 
the Concept of a Mechanism. Philosophy of Science 71,1-15. 
60  
Wimsatt, William C. 1998. "Simple Systems and Phylogenetic Di-
versity." Philosophy of Science 65: 267-275. 
Woodward, James. 2002. What Is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual 
Account. Philosophy of Science 69: 366-377. 
— — —. 2003. Making Things Happen. A Theory of Causal Expla-
nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— — —. 2004. Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation. Interna-
tional Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18: 41-72. 
— — —. 2010. Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the 
Choice of Levels of Explanation. Biology and Philosophy 25: 
287-318. 
 
 
